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Summary
Aim. The main aim of presented paper is the discussion with the anti-psychiatry’s and postpsychiatry’s 
critique of psychiatric inpatient wards and their practices.
Method and subject. Basing on the story of one patient, the chance for dialogue with the inpatient even 
in the case of actual forced treatment is presented. Is a dialogue with a patient possible in spite of the fact 
that a “psychiatric language” takes place?
Discussion and conclusions. According to the authors the response to this question reveals the com-
plexity of the reality hidden behind the locked door of a clinic. The reality of locked psychiatric wards is 
neither exclusively constructed by “psychiatric games” (as stated in the writings of anti-psychiatrists and 
the postmodern psychiatrists), nor it can be only the reality of running dialogue. The reality of psychiat-
ric clinic is oscillating between the two different possibilities of contact with patients. Some ethical conse-
quences of it will be considered in presented paper.
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INTrODuCTION
The anti-psychiatric movement and other 
schools of thinking about psychiatric treatment, 
derived from post-modern philosophy, have 
made locked psychiatric wards and their prac-
tice an object of their criticism. The anti-psychi-
atric movement defended “others”, all those de-
prived of freedom and autonomy, supposedly on 
their behalf and in their best interest, but in fact 
it was to protect the social system endangered 
by “otherness”. Each system, also the social sys-
tem, aims at excluding whatever puts it in dan-
ger, in order to increase its efficiency. From the 
point of view of the system, the privileged are 
those who talk and act alike. Unity and acting 
in agreement as well as a kind of insensitivity to 
suffering are the key ingredients of the strength 
and durability of any system. Those “Others” – 
historically referred to as the “possessed”, “in-
sane” or “changelings”, since the 18th century 
have been known as the “mentally ill” as they 
escape the system control and therefore become 
dangerous to it. According to anti-psychiatrists, 
since the moment it was born, a psychiatric clin-
ic has stood to protect the system [1, 2].
The criticism of psychiatric clinic, undertaken 
by authors who admit that they sympathise with 
postmodernism, is above all concerned with the 
language used in clinics, the so called “psychiat-
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ric language games”, and the reality constructed 
by it. Modernism of psychiatric and psychother-
apeutic practice, as these are the terms used, is 
above all based on a clear division of authority: 
on the one hand, there is medical personnel with 
its specialist knowledge, expertise in health, ill-
ness and treatment process (expert at what is 
good for patients), and on the other hand a pa-
tient, seen as a laymen who is expected to sim-
ply become subordinate. The “psychiatric lan-
guage games” not only “deprive of mind and 
speech” all those who are diagnosed as mentally 
ill but additionally, they stigmatise these people 
and exclude them from a healthy discourse [3].
The aim of this paper is to discuss this subject 
area from the point of view of a team working in 
a locked psychiatric ward. Based on a casuistic 
description, we will present the dilemmas facing 
a team treating a patient without his consent. Is 
a dialogue with a patient possible in spite of the 
fact that a “psychiatric game” takes place?
Casuistic description
Łukasz,	a	holder	of	a	number	of	university	
degrees (including a degree in psychology) has 
lived in London for a few years. He was finan-
cially independent, having worked consecutively 
as a teacher, tutor, barman, and a waiter in high-
end restaurants. He changed jobs frequently and 
found it easy to find work. His situation turned 
unexpectedly a few months before returning to 
Poland. He lost his job and his flat, fell into debt 
and spent most of his time trying to find work, 
without much luck. Finally, he ended up won-
dering the streets of London with a laptop un-
der his arm. He stopped getting in touch with 
his family or his cousin, who also lived in Lon-
don, because – as he explained later – he had no 
money for telephone calls. His parents, first anx-
ious and then frightened by the news they had 
from London, and by the decreasing frequen-
cy of phone calls from their son; the news that 
he had no work, no place to live and his debt 
was growing, started an intensive campaign to 
make him return to Poland. Even back then, they 
were very concerned about his health, so they 
also consulted a psychiatrist in a psychiatric clin-
ic. When, after many attempts, they managed to 
get	in	touch	with	Łukasz	and	persuade	him	to	
return to Poland, they were in no doubt that he 
was mentally ill. They thought he was unrecog-
nisable: he lost a lot of weight, neglected his ap-
pearance, told them that he lived in a few par-
allel realities at the same time, that he was con-
trolled from the “top”, that he was burnt by elec-
tricity and had stones thrown at him. He tried 
to calm his parents down to say that his life was 
run by higher forces. He could not understand 
his family’s fears and did not share their con-
viction	that	he	should	see	a	psychiatrist.	Łukasz	
thought that he was entirely healthy and he ex-
plained his financial difficulties by the fact that 
he had no money to repair his glasses, and as he 
had worked in one of London’s top restaurants, 
smart appearance was one of the main require-
ments for the job.
Because his parents could not make him un-
dertake treatment and were becoming increas-
ingly concerned for his life – one day for exam-
ple he sat practically in the street – which made 
his parents think that in a physical sense he did 
not care whether he was alive or dead – and so 
the family began to try to get treatment for him 
in a psychiatric clinic, without his consent. They 
have	tricked	Łukasz,	as	his	uncle	promised	to	
finance his return to London, in exchange for a 
consultation in a psychiatric clinic, and so this is 
how the family managed to bring him to the out-
patients psychiatric clinic.
In	the	clinic,	Łukasz	refused	to	talk	to	a	psychi-
atrist but he agreed to talk to a psychologist, and 
during the conversation he maintained that he 
was mentally healthy. The psychologist did not 
think that, under the circumstances, treatment 
without consent was justified and he shared his 
opinion with the psychiatrist.
A few days later, with the growing fear for 
their son’s health and life, and facing increas-
ing helplessness in their attempts to persuade 
him to seek help, the parents have again man-
aged	to	bring	Łukasz	to	the	psychiatric	out-pa-
tient	clinic,	with	Łukasz’s	consent.	Having	exam-
ined him, the psychiatrist has made a decision to 
treat	Łukasz	without	his	consent	in	a	locked	psy-
chiatric ward, based on the Mental Health Act of 
19 August 1994.
As	a	patient,	Łukasz	accepted	the	doctor’s	
decision full of ambivalent feelings and judg-
ments. He interchangeably declared his consent 
to treatment and then withdrew it. Eventually, 
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he maintained that he was mentally healthy, and 
he does not consent to the rigour of treatment in 
a locked door ward. He also made it known that 
he would leave the ward should any opportuni-
ty present itself.
Finally, based on Article 23 of Mental Health 
Act,	the	decision	was	made	to	treat	Łukasz	with-
out	his	consent.	At	a	session	attended	by	Łukasz,	
accompanied by a doctor and two psychologists, 
the judge ruled that the decision was justified 
and	Łukasz	was	to	be	treated	in	a	locked	psy-
chiatric ward.
Łukasz	remained	in	a	locked	ward	for	the	fol-
lowing ten days. He obeyed its rules and regu-
lations passively and was discharged at his own 
request. Because the circumstances that com-
mitted	Łukasz	in	the	first	place	were	no	longer	
there,	the	psychiatrist	discharged	Łukasz	from	
the ward, even though he did not share his view 
that the continuation of hospital treatment was 
unjustified. After the discharge from the hospi-
tal,	Łukasz	attended	a	few	visits	he	previously	
agreed with his doctor. The latest information 
that the psychiatrist managed to obtain from 
Łukasz’s	family	is	that	he	went	to	England	for	
a few months, in spite of the fact that he left for 
England ill; he did not follow any treatment and 
was recently brought to a hospital by the police 
because of his aggressive behaviour. He was ad-
mitted to a psychiatric ward but escaped from 
there. Finally, he has returned to Poland on his 
own accord and has been admitted to a psychi-
atric hospital.
Psychiatric language games, or dialogue with the 
patient?
The case described here will be now provided 
with a commentary in order to answer the ques-
tion	asked	above.	It	must	be	emphasized	that	the	
patient’s story has been told and commented on 
one-sidedly by the members of his therapeutic 
team, and it would probably be told differently 
if it were discussed by the patient.
Is the reality of a locked psychiatric ward a 
constructed space, as the anti-psychiatrists and 
postmodern psychiatrists have it, by “psychiat-
ric language games”? If so, is a dialogue with 
patients possible at all in the space dominated 
by ”psychiatric games”? The response to these 
questions is far from being unequivocal, as it re-
veals the complexity of the reality hidden be-
hind the locked door of a clinic. What goes on 
behind this door is on the one hand, the “psy-
chiatric game” and on the other, in spite of the 
game or against it, there are attempts in under-
taking a dialogue. Some of the aspects of this 
complex reality and its consequences will be 
considered below.
Non-dialectic interchangeability or co-existence (?) 
of psychiatric games and dialogue
As soon as a person enters a locked psychi-
atric ward she or he becomes a patient rather 
than just a person of rather unidentified identi-
ty, as seen from the third person’s perspective, 
that she or he was a few moments before. A per-
son treated without consent becomes a patient 
against her or his will, subordinate to the will of 
the doctor who makes treatment decisions. Once 
the decision is made that this is the role that the 
person has to take, she or he is literally seen as 
a patient by others; the external identity takes 
over the internal feeling of who the treated per-
son really is. The first manifestation of this “tak-
ing over” is the fact that once a person becomes 
a patient without consent, she or he has to face 
up to a number of expectations, most of which 
are about making the individual subordinate to 
the rules and regulations of the treatment sys-
tem.	In	the	case	described	here,	Łukasz	was	im-
mediately expected to follow the hierarchy of 
authority and operating rules of the system that 
he was now a part of, against his will; more spe-
cifically he had to follow the established sched-
ule, meal times, medication times, conditions of 
accommodation which meant that he could not 
decide who he shared his bedroom with, orders 
to remain in the ward at all times, to inform the 
medical personnel of any intention of leaving 
the ward, the duty to participate in the commu-
nity meetings and other forms of individual and 
group therapy and also to undergo tests recom-
mended by his psychiatrist. The key to the ward 
is a symbol of hierarchy followed in the locked 
psychiatric ward, and of the related rights and 
duties: it is held by all members of the therapeu-
tic team but by none of the patients. The symbol-
ism	of	a	key	(according	to	W.	Kopaliński’s	“Dic-
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tionary of Symbols” a key is a symbol of author-
ity, supervision, order, initiation, knowledge, de-
liberation and of phallus; the key to paradise, 
eternal life) emphasises even further the divi-
sion of authority behind the locked door of psy-
chiatric clinics [4].
On the other hand, from the very beginning of 
his hospitalisation, the psychiatric team under-
took the dialogue attempts with the patient treat-
ed without consent. An important part of these 
attempts	was	inviting	Łukasz	and	his	family	to	
participate in the so-called family consultation 
[5]. The invitation is not a euphemism here: both 
Łukasz	and	his	family	could	either	accept	or	re-
ject the proposal. Also the way the consultation 
was held and the subject of conversation depend-
ed on the patient and his family: the therapist 
who began the meeting, previously uninvolved 
in	Łukasz’s	treatment	process	(and	in	this	sense	
in a way from “outside of the system”) asked the 
persons participating in a meeting if they want-
ed to share their own understanding of this situ-
ation with the therapeutic team. The conversation 
was to be an opportunity to undertake dialogue 
for people who experience and understand the 
world differently and in this sense, everyone is an 
expert of their own perspective on the world. The 
conversation that took place during the consulta-
tion was a conversation between various experts, 
none of whom held the key to the reality as it re-
ally is or as it should be. The medical perspective, 
which dominates the psychiatric ward was sus-
pended for the time of consultation, and replaced 
with other individual perspectives, such as this 
one	expressed	by	Łukasz:	“Even	if	health	repre-
sents the highest value from the point of view of 
my family and doctors, and even if according to 
them my own health is in danger, and in order to 
protect it I must be deprived of the right to oth-
er values, something else is of the highest value 
to me. Just as it used to be for my father: he nev-
er underwent treatment for alcoholism, in spite of 
the fact that I begged him, asked him and tried to 
convince him to do so”.
The ambiguity of realities behind the locked doors 
of clinics.
Another aspect of the reality described here is 
the difficulty (impossibility?) to decide wheth-
er what goes on is a “psychiatric game” or an 
attempt to run a dialogue with the person who 
is being treated. Both a dialogue and a game 
require an involvement of at least two parties. 
Each of them decides independently on a dilem-
ma expressed in the question: do I participate 
in the game I am made to play, or am I hold-
ing a conversation; additionally the answer to 
the question is not given once and for all but it 
may be changing, sometimes from one moment 
to another. And the intentions of the people in-
volved in the game or the dialogue, as the case 
may be, are often difficult to interpret explicit-
ly. It may happen that what is experienced as 
an attempt at a dialogue from the perspective of 
a therapeutic team might be, on a part of a pa-
tient, understood as a game (strategy), which is 
to lead the system to an overall win. Often what 
is consciously intended by a therapeutic team 
as an attempt at a dialogue, in which a patient 
is to be treated as a partner, turns into an uncon-
scious attempt at pressurising the patient to un-
dertake treatment.
This ambiguity can be well illustrated by the 
following	episode	of	Łukasz’s	stay	in	the	ward.	
After a long hesitation, the therapeutic team 
agreed	to	Łukasz’s	presence	in	the	court	session	
taking place outside of the clinic. On the one 
hand,	as	the	decision	was	risky,	because	Łukasz	
made his intensions to run away from the ward 
given the first opportunity absolutely clear, what 
one could see here is an approach leaning to-
wards a dialogue with the patient, and the re-
spect of the other person. On the other hand, 
however, as decided by the therapeutic team, 
Łukasz	was	escorted	to	the	court	building	by	
three team members, just in case, as it was said 
at the time, he wanted to run away – and this is 
already a part of a “psychiatric game”. Trust-
ing a partner, and there is no point to even men-
tion it, if you can anticipate his or her behaviour, 
which is a necessary condition for beginning a 
dialogue, has not emerged from the team’s deci-
sion. It is the lack of trust which put the “psychi-
atric game” into motion, since as many as three 
team	members	accompanied	Łukasz	on	the	way	
to the court building (by the way, here is a miss-
ing	piece	of	a	puzzle	that	we	are	not	even	try-
ing	to	solve:	Łukasz	did	indeed	try	to	run	away	
on his way back from the court, he was stopped 
and escorted to the clinic. Would he run away 
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if not for the game with its underlying lack of 
trust and fear?).
One more episode illustrating the ambiguity 
of reality behind the locked door: when the jus-
tification for the forced treatment in a psychiat-
ric	ward	was	no	longer	there,	Łukasz	addressed	
his doctor with a request to be discharged. The 
psychiatrist agreed, although he did not think 
Łukasz’s	decision	to	be	right.	Was	the	doctor’s	
consent to discharge the patient an expression 
of his dialogue approach, as we wish to think, 
or was it a part of a “psychiatric game” – after all 
the Mental Health Act clearly states when and 
in what circumstances the doctor can rightfully 
hold a patient in a psychiatric ward, without her 
or his consent (even the expression used in this 
context “the doctor’s consent to discharge the 
patient”	emphasize	the	ambiguity	that	is	meant	
here).
DISCuSSION
The interchangeability of “psychiatric lan-
guage games” and attempts at a dialogue with 
a patient reveals an overlap of two different re-
alities and two ethics, understood as principles 
of actions, behind the locked doors of psychiat-
ric clinics.
The reality of a dialogue is an unpredictable 
world, which cannot be pre-arranged; the world 
dominated by questions about how to establish 
a relationship with a patient; shall we try to do 
so at all, and if we do, then what is it in the name 
of? It is the world of not one answer but at least 
two. A one-sided approach is inevitably ambig-
uous in this world, also ethically ambiguous. In 
the reality constructed by dialogue, none of the 
parties that remain in relationship with each oth-
er can legitimately know anything better (espe-
cially what is good and what is not); both par-
ties are in a similar situation: they are trying to 
enter into a relationship with another human be-
ing, although they do not know what will come 
out of it. None of the answers to “what for?” 
question explains these attempts. The interests 
external to the relationship contradict the idea 
of a dialogue. When one of the parties knows 
what they want to achieve, a dialogue can not 
happen. It is just the way to resist what the other 
person has to say. What is ethical is what serves 
the purpose of building a relationship. Good, as 
one hopes, simply happens as the relationship 
goes on [6, 7, 8, 9].
The reality of “psychiatric language games” 
is sanctioned by medical knowledge, treat-
ed as objective by the Western culture, which 
is still dominated by the Enlightenment men-
tality. The world of “psychiatric games” is the 
world “seen from the top” , based on “objective 
knowledge”, established hierarchies and pre-ar-
ranged systems of hierarchically arranged rights 
and duties. It is the world of ready-made (but 
only seemingly so if one were to analyse them) 
answers, specified standards and procedures. It 
is the world of objective order of values, where 
life and health, understood merely as the lack of 
clinical symptoms, are the highest good. What-
ever serves health is good, and for this value oth-
er values can be sacrificed, such as freedom for 
example.
These two overlapping realities of locked psy-
chiatric wards have different corresponding pos-
sibilities and limitations. In the world construct-
ed by dialogue a relationship is possible but so is 
the breaking of it. Each relationship is unavoid-
ably ambiguous – on the one hand it is about 
getting close, on the other, about the distance 
which makes the relationship possible (with-
out a distance it would be nonsensical to talk 
about relationships as they necessarily involve 
the presence of two distinct parties). By enter-
ing into a relationship with a patient one risks 
entering into the otherness: what can happen is 
not exactly what one wants to happen. Uncer-
tainty and unpredictability are the price of a re-
lationship.
In the world created by “psychiatric language 
games” one does not risk meeting the other but 
the same. The certainty inherent in the participa-
tion in a “language game” comes from the pre-
dictability of the world, which reveals in front of 
us what our game has already predicted. In the 
world of “psychiatric games” we see what we 
have anticipated to see. The game brings about 
the world which exists as long as the authori-
ty of those who have called it into being exists. 
A therapist, involved in a psychiatric game with 
a patient, can count on the fact that the patient 
will follow her or his recommendations, but she 
or he will have to consider, that the patient will 
be subordinate only as far as the therapist’s au-
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thority extends. What happens afterward is out 
of therapists’ reach. Beyond the reality created 
by “psychiatric games” the other may happen, 
unaccounted for by the game.
 CONCluSIONS
The experience of working with patients treat-
ed without their consent in a psychiatric ward, 
which reveals the complexity of reality con-
cealed behind the locked doors of psychiatric 
clinics, brings us to the following conclusions 
that challenge the views presented at the begin-
ning of this paper.
The image of reality of locked psychiatric 
wards, as described in the writings of anti-psy-
chiatrists, and their contemporary heirs – the 
postmodern psychiatrists – is simplified: the re-
ality they describe is neither exclusively con-
structed by “psychiatric games”, nor it can be 
only – as they propose – the reality of a running 
dialogue. In fact, various attempts are made to 
undertake dialogue with patients, in spite of the 
fact that a “psychiatric game” is indeed taking 
place. The reality of psychiatric clinic is oscil-
lating between the two different possibilities of 
contact with patients.
This non-dialectic (not leading to Hegelian syn-
thesis) interchangeability or co-existence of over-
lapping realities discloses an unsolvable conflict 
of values that therapeutic teams of locked wards 
are immersed in: on the one hand there is the 
order of values fixed in medical tradition, with 
human life and health leading the way (and it is 
worth	emphasizing	what	is	meant	is	the	tradi-
tion of the Enlightenment), and on the other, the 
order of values commonly described as human-
ist, with freedom and right of independent deci-
sion making. The unsuitability of the conflict is 
consolidated by the question which always aris-
es in this context: can one sacrifice the values 
of an individual to protect health defined from 
medical perspective? Who has the power to an-
swer this question? Who holds the key?
The unavoidable ambiguity of reality behind 
the locked doors of psychiatric wards makes us 
think that the ethical dilemmas that psychiatric 
teams are facing today may never be resolved. 
To resolve something means that it is no longer 
bound together, also in a sense of being bound 
by duty. The dilemmas which are resolved no 
longer bind together, and no longer produce 
a sense of duty. The unavoidable ambiguity of 
locked wards can be and should be contrasted 
with the clarity of a requirement that has to be 
considered by therapeutic teams in a form of 
their duty to continually reflect on the rationale 
for their actions: why and in the name of what 
is an action taken? It is only by asking questions 
and by keeping the dilemmas alive that the pro-
fessional ethics, though unresolved, keeps one 
committed.
Among other methods of coping with the am-
biguity of realities of locked psychiatric wards, 
which were not only heard aloud but also en-
dorsed, was, for example, the closing down and 
liquidation of these wards or treating patients 
without their consent only in the forensic wards, 
but these are merely the ways of liquidating di-
lemmas instead of facing up to them. Any at-
tempt at facing up to these dilemmas means 
keeping them alive in spite of the related risks.
It is not clear whether any attempts made 
by therapeutic teams to help patients treated 
without consent are in any sense supporting 
them. Our experience teaches us that the old 
Hippocratic principle: “do no harm” implies 
“have doubt.”
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